Chamber
Plenary, 11 Mar 2009
11 Mar 2009 · S3 · Plenary
Item of business
Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) Bill: <br />Stage 3
The amendment in my name is rather tortuous to read, as things in my name often are, but it is relatively simple at heart. It would ensure that the projected costs under the bill are monitored after royal assent and that explanations are provided for any significant variance. Similar amendments have been lodged to other bills that are in progress, as the issue is of general application rather than specific to this bill.
Some might consider that the amendment is too prescriptive or that it represents overkill. However, I argue that the reporting mechanism is relatively simple. The first subsection would simply require a report to be laid before Parliament each year on the costs that have arisen under the bill, no later than six months after the end of the financial year. Given that the Scottish Government published its consolidated accounts, which cover everything that it does, within the allotted timeframe last year, there can be no suggestion that the timescale in subsection (1) of the new section that amendment 9 would insert in the bill is too onerous.
Subsection (2) sets out what the report should contain: in essence, the annual and accumulated costs incurred under the act, and their equivalents in the financial memorandum, together with the difference between the two sets of figures. The only real effort that the report would require is the identification of the actual costs that are incurred, which we might legitimately expect the Government to want to know in any case to assess the cost effectiveness of its policy interventions.
Subsections (3) to (5) set out de minimis provisions to trigger a further duty on ministers to report its explanation of why costs are higher or lower than expected and what, if anything, they propose to do in response. That duty would be triggered only if the variance met one of the thresholds in subsection (4). However, given that subsection (5) does not set out the level of detail that ministers would have to provide in explaining the reasons behind cost variances, the requirement would not be particularly onerous, even if it were to be applied in every case.
Subsection (6) would place a general duty on ministers to consult bodies in preparing information for the report in the same way that they consult in preparing for a financial memorandum. However, as most relevant bodies would have been identified in the process of preparing the financial memorandum, the duty would be less onerous on external bodies and Government than the preparation of the estimates in the financial memorandum.
Subsection (7) is permissive and not prescriptive. Subsection (8) deals with situations where the financial memorandum includes no figure for later years. Subsection (9) details the groups of bodies other than central Government on whom relevant costs might fall. I have used the same headings that rule 9.3 of the standing orders for financial memorandum uses. Subsection (10) would allow the Parliament to suspend reports without repealing the entire bill after a period of five years following royal assent. Subsection (11) is on the interpretation of subsection (10) and subsection (12) deals with terminology.
As I said, the general principle is a simple one. It is that routine examination of cost estimates should be made after, and not only before, a bill has been passed. The aim of doing that is not only to learn lessons on the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of the policy intention for a bill but to ensure improvement in the process of making future cost estimates. Such a process need be neither time consuming nor unwieldy. Indeed, it is easier and cheaper to collect such information from the outset and not to have to go back through records in response to parliamentary questions or freedom of information requests.
Routine examination of the accuracy of cost estimates and the questions that such examination raises would offer a further level of financial scrutiny to legislation that would allow any emerging problem to be dealt with more speedily than would otherwise be the case. If agreed to, the section would mark a new approach for the Parliament. If it were adopted more generally, it would lead to a much more robust system of legislative scrutiny than exists at present either in the Scottish Parliament or at Westminster. That makes it a tempting proposal for the Government.
I move amendment 9.
Some might consider that the amendment is too prescriptive or that it represents overkill. However, I argue that the reporting mechanism is relatively simple. The first subsection would simply require a report to be laid before Parliament each year on the costs that have arisen under the bill, no later than six months after the end of the financial year. Given that the Scottish Government published its consolidated accounts, which cover everything that it does, within the allotted timeframe last year, there can be no suggestion that the timescale in subsection (1) of the new section that amendment 9 would insert in the bill is too onerous.
Subsection (2) sets out what the report should contain: in essence, the annual and accumulated costs incurred under the act, and their equivalents in the financial memorandum, together with the difference between the two sets of figures. The only real effort that the report would require is the identification of the actual costs that are incurred, which we might legitimately expect the Government to want to know in any case to assess the cost effectiveness of its policy interventions.
Subsections (3) to (5) set out de minimis provisions to trigger a further duty on ministers to report its explanation of why costs are higher or lower than expected and what, if anything, they propose to do in response. That duty would be triggered only if the variance met one of the thresholds in subsection (4). However, given that subsection (5) does not set out the level of detail that ministers would have to provide in explaining the reasons behind cost variances, the requirement would not be particularly onerous, even if it were to be applied in every case.
Subsection (6) would place a general duty on ministers to consult bodies in preparing information for the report in the same way that they consult in preparing for a financial memorandum. However, as most relevant bodies would have been identified in the process of preparing the financial memorandum, the duty would be less onerous on external bodies and Government than the preparation of the estimates in the financial memorandum.
Subsection (7) is permissive and not prescriptive. Subsection (8) deals with situations where the financial memorandum includes no figure for later years. Subsection (9) details the groups of bodies other than central Government on whom relevant costs might fall. I have used the same headings that rule 9.3 of the standing orders for financial memorandum uses. Subsection (10) would allow the Parliament to suspend reports without repealing the entire bill after a period of five years following royal assent. Subsection (11) is on the interpretation of subsection (10) and subsection (12) deals with terminology.
As I said, the general principle is a simple one. It is that routine examination of cost estimates should be made after, and not only before, a bill has been passed. The aim of doing that is not only to learn lessons on the effectiveness and cost effectiveness of the policy intention for a bill but to ensure improvement in the process of making future cost estimates. Such a process need be neither time consuming nor unwieldy. Indeed, it is easier and cheaper to collect such information from the outset and not to have to go back through records in response to parliamentary questions or freedom of information requests.
Routine examination of the accuracy of cost estimates and the questions that such examination raises would offer a further level of financial scrutiny to legislation that would allow any emerging problem to be dealt with more speedily than would otherwise be the case. If agreed to, the section would mark a new approach for the Parliament. If it were adopted more generally, it would lead to a much more robust system of legislative scrutiny than exists at present either in the Scottish Parliament or at Westminster. That makes it a tempting proposal for the Government.
I move amendment 9.
In the same item of business
The Presiding Officer (Alex Fergusson):
NPA
The next item of business is stage 3 proceedings on the Damages (Asbestos-related Conditions) (Scotland) Bill. In dealing with amendments, members should hav...
Section 1—Pleural plaques
The Presiding Officer:
NPA
Amendment 1, in the name of the Minister for Community Safety, is grouped with amendments 2 to 8.
The Minister for Community Safety (Fergus Ewing):
SNP
To set the context for the individual amendments that the Government has lodged, I will briefly recap what I said during the stage 2 proceedings. I made clea...
Bill Butler (Glasgow Anniesland) (Lab):
Lab
Justice Committee members and the minister will recall that I lodged stage 2 amendments that were intended not to change the effect of the bill but to ensure...
Robert Brown (Glasgow) (LD):
LD
I will comment briefly, primarily to thank the minister for his attitude, on which Bill Butler touched. Underlying the amendments and our discussion at stage...
Fergus Ewing:
SNP
I thank Bill Butler, Robert Brown and the other Justice Committee members for the way in which these somewhat technical matters were dealt with. We all wante...
Amendment 1 agreed to.
Amendments 2 and 3 moved—Fergus Ewing—and agreed to.
Section 2—Pleural thickening and asbestosis
Amendments 4 to 7 moved—Fergus Ewing—and agreed to.
Section 3—Limitation of actions
Amendment 8 moved—Fergus Ewing—and agreed to.
After section 3
The Presiding Officer:
NPA
Amendment 9, in the name of Derek Brownlee, is in a group on its own.
Derek Brownlee (South of Scotland) (Con):
Con
The amendment in my name is rather tortuous to read, as things in my name often are, but it is relatively simple at heart. It would ensure that the projected...
Richard Baker (North East Scotland) (Lab):
Lab
The bill has enjoyed unanimous support so far and I hope that that continues to be the case today. However, I am afraid that I cannot support the amendment i...
Robert Brown:
LD
I agree entirely with Richard Baker's remarks, especially his last comment. Scrutiny of the costs of legislation is a matter for the Public Audit Committee a...
Patrick Harvie (Glasgow) (Green):
Green
Derek Brownlee might wish that I were not the person to back him up, but it is about time that someone did. From time to time, parliamentary committees have ...
Fergus Ewing:
SNP
I thank Derek Brownlee for clearly outlining his thinking on the purpose that he sought to achieve by lodging amendment 9. He has raised an important issue a...
Derek Brownlee:
Con
I thank Patrick Harvie—the list of people to thank is not as long as it might have been. I will resist the temptation to rebut Robert Brown's comments about ...
Amendment 9, by agreement, withdrawn.
The Deputy Presiding Officer (Alasdair Morgan):
SNP
That ends consideration of amendments.