Hansard

I welcome the opportunity to open this debate on the Standards, Procedures and Public Appointments Committee’s fifth report in 2010. The report covers the recommendations of the Commission on Scottish Devolution that relate to Scottish Parliament procedures.

At the start of the year, the Parliamentary Bureau asked the committee to consider 16 of the commission’s 60 recommendations. All the recommendations relate to proposed changes to the Scottish Parliament’s procedures, how the Parliament interacts with the United Kingdom Parliament and how the Scottish Government interacts with the UK Government.

The committee had no remit to consider the larger policy issues that the Calman commission covered, so my remarks will be limited to the procedural issues that we were asked to consider.

When the recommendations were referred to the committee, it was not clear how and when the work of the commission would be taken forward, so the committee was asked to look only at what would need to be done if the recommendations were implemented. Following the UK election, the Scotland Office moved very quickly to instruct a bill, which is to be introduced in the autumn. Because of that, the committee had to change its approach. Instead of producing an initial report and carrying out further consideration if the Parliament so wished, we have reached specific conclusions on what should be taken forward, especially when amendments to the Scotland Act 1998 would be needed.

The accelerated timetable also meant that some recommendations could not be given the careful consideration and consultation that might have been desirable. In particular, the committee had to set aside its intention to review in depth all the provisions of the Scotland Act 1998 that constrain the Parliament’s procedures or working arrangements. Such a review would be desirable and may happen at a future date, but it could not have been completed in time for the introduction of the UK Government’s bill. In any case, our conclusion is that many of the recommendations that were referred to us can better and more easily be progressed through informal mechanisms, without the need for formal procedural change.

I will take members through the committee’s recommendations, beginning with intergovernmental and interparliamentary relations, which a number of Calman’s recommendations addressed. In general, the committee supports those recommendations. Two of them concerned the Secretary of State for Scotland: one said that he should appear annually before a Scottish Parliament committee and the other said that he should appear before the Scottish Parliament to discuss the legislative programme. We concluded that there was no need for the minister’s appearances to be formal parliamentary proceedings. In that way, the arrangements could be kept flexible. We noted that that was how Michael Moore’s successful appearance at the Parliament earlier this year was managed.

We also considered the recommendation that the Scottish and UK Parliaments should be able, when appropriate, to agree to a motion that sought a response from the other jurisdiction’s Government. We concluded that a formal procedure of that sort was unnecessary and that the Scottish Parliament was already well able to make its views known to the UK Parliament when required, whether through debates, correspondence, evidence sessions or Scottish Government ministers.

A number of Calman’s recommendations concerned relations between parliamentary committees. They included proposals on a standing joint liaison committee and subject-specific ad hoc committees, on arrangements whereby members of one Parliament could join a committee meeting of the other Parliament, and on the sharing of information between committees. The committee noted that formal joint committee working would require an amendment to the Scotland Act 1998, that issues of parliamentary privilege and other differing procedural rules would have to be addressed, and that issues around data protection and powers to call for documents would have to be resolved. Given those complexities, the committee concluded that it made sense to develop more informal joint working arrangements in the first instance.

The commission recommended that Scottish MEPs should be invited to attend meetings of the European and External Relations Committee, but we noted that that could be difficult, given the different sitting patterns of the European and Scottish Parliaments. We prefer the model that the European and External Relations Committee suggested for increasing links with MEPs; I will not run through all the detail, which is set out in our report.

The commission made a number of proposals on legislative consent memorandums. First, it called for the establishment of direct channels of communication between the Scottish and UK Parliaments. The Parliament may wish to consider agreeing a protocol with the UK Parliament.

The commission also recommended a procedure whereby the Scottish Parliament could seek permission to legislate in reserved areas in which there was a close connection with the exercise of devolved powers. We noted the example given by the commission in relation to the Somerville case, in which existing Scotland Act 1998 provisions were used to give the Scottish Government power to legislate, with political agreement, and, once the immediate problem had been resolved, to remove the power to legislate. The committee felt that that demonstrated that flexibility already exists in the current powers, and that a specific additional procedure might not be needed.

I turn to the Parliament’s procedures. Eight of the recommendations referred to the committee are about the Parliament’s procedures. On committees, the commission recommended that the level of turnover of committee membership should be minimised. We agreed that that would be valuable but that it is a matter for the political parties and not something than can be set out in standing orders. The commission also proposed that committees should have more freedom to establish sub-committees, but as little use has been made of sub-committees, we saw no evidence of committee demand for sub-committees not being met.

On the Scottish Parliament’s legislative process, the commission made three recommendations. First, it recommended that the three-stage bill process should be changed to a four-stage process. The Parliament can already separate stage 3 amendment proceedings from the stage 3 debate, and there is adequate flexibility in the current rules for a four-stage process to be used if required.

Secondly, the commission recommended that any MSP should be able to propose that parts of a bill be referred back to committee for further consideration. That power is currently restricted to the member in charge of the bill. We felt that the recommendation is too broad but suggest that further consideration be given to extending the power to lead committee members in view of their expertise and interest in a bill.

Thirdly, the commission proposed that the Presiding Officer should identify amendments at stage 3 that raise new issues and should be given further committee scrutiny. There could be a pitfall with that recommendation and we do not recommend pursuing it.

I move to the general review of the Scotland Act 1998. The commission recommended a review of all the provisions in the act that constrain the Parliament’s procedures or working arrangements. First, in relation to the statement on legislative competence that ministers must make when a bill is introduced, it recommended that that should extend to any person who introduces a bill. The second recommendation is to give Parliament the option of providing flexibility over the number of members of the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body. The third recommendation is to allow greater flexibility about the timing of the Presiding Officer’s appointment at the start of a session and to allow temporary additional deputies to be appointed if necessary.

The commission also saw a case for amendment of the provisions that govern members’ interests. As the committee with lead responsibility for the code of conduct, we agree that some greater discretion over the interests regime is desirable. The committee believes that, after 10 years in existence, the Scottish Parliament could take more responsibility for establishing its own interests regime. Current provisions do not make any distinction between a minor or excusable breach and a serious, intentional breach of a criminal nature. In contrast, parliamentary sanctions can be adjusted more flexibly, but there is no scope under the current regime for the Parliament to consider whether there is a reasonable excuse for a breach. We would like the current provisions to be replaced with a more general power that would allow the Parliament to adapt its interests regime more comprehensively in response to changing circumstances. Such a power would still offer safeguards to ensure that a comprehensive members’ interests regime was in place. However, the first step is to move the governance of members’ interests to the Parliament. Consideration of any changes to the regime would have to take place in the next parliamentary session.

Finally, I thank all the officials and all the members of the committee for their considerable work and effort in compiling the report.

I move,

That the Parliament notes the Standards, Procedures and Public Appointments Committee’s 5th Report 2010 (Session 3), Report on the recommendations of the Commission on Scottish Devolution regarding Scottish Parliament procedures (SP Paper 490) and agrees to its recommendations and conclusions.