Hansard

The encouraging part of today's debate was the will that exists across Parliament for further measures to be taken to give added protection to young people, and to children in particular.

In her opening remarks, the minister graphically and eloquently stated the case for why we need to act. The point was made in a number of contributions that the type of person with whom we are dealing is not just malign in their motivations, not just malicious in their intentions, but can be extremely unscrupulous and devious in the way in which they act in order to manipulate certain circumstances. They are intent on harming children and they will go to any lengths to carry out that harm.

It is right that we should update our law to reflect the changes that take place in society and which happen around us, but it would be foolish to minimise some of the difficulties with which the advent of the internet has presented us. Although it would be noble to have the intention of trying to do as much as we could, the technology and the way in which it can be used are moving on at speed, as members have clearly indicated. However, that is no excuse for us not to try to do everything that we can to introduce sufficient protection.

A number of concerns have been raised during the debate. Although I will not have time to deal with each of them, they will all be considered carefully. I have already said that we will reflect further on a number of issues, because we need to get the legislation right. Although it would be right for us to reflect on the points that have been made and perhaps shift in an effort to improve the bill, it would also be right for us to take a firm view and to resist proposals that would have poor or adverse legal implications, even if they were made with the best of intentions. In seeking to help children, the last thing that we want to do is to create more problems further down the line, so we need to proceed with caution.

Stewart Stevenson talked about some of the benefits of English legislation in comparison with Scottish legislation, but some of those benefits are implied under Scots law; we do not have to be as specific as English law must be. He referred to section 14 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, but that provision is ancillary to a number of sexual offences in England and Wales and, as it stands, it would not work in Scotland. That said, it is proper that we consider further whether there is any equivalence that might be helpful.

Margaret Mitchell made a number of points that were echoed by other members. She talked about the age of the victim and asked for clarification of whether the burden of proof should lie with the Crown or the accused. We have consulted with the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service and it is content that the burden of proof should rest with the Crown, but we will consider that further to determine whether any improvements can be made.

Another issue that was mentioned by a number of speakers, including Mary Mulligan, was breach of the peace and the question whether that should become an offence that could trigger inclusion in the sex offenders register. However, the fact that someone has been involved in a breach of the peace scenario could already trigger inclusion in the register. Under paragraph 60 of schedule 3 to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the judge can direct that a person who has been convicted of any offence should be subject to the sex offenders registration scheme if

"there was a significant sexual aspect to the offender's behaviour in committing the offence."

Other issues to do with the use of breach of the peace in common law have been raised. There are circumstances in which breach of the peace can lead to action. We are talking not about replacing breach of the peace, but about adding to it and still using it when it is necessary to do so.

A number of speakers dealt with RSHOs, about which I think there are some misconceptions. It is right to worry about the potential for stigmatisation, but I do not accept Patrick Harvie's arguments, which apply to different circumstances. The proposal in the bill is highly specific. It is right for us to consider giving protection to children to prevent certain acts from happening. I would argue that action is imperative when a child or a group of children are at imminent risk.

Issues have been raised about the difference between full and interim risk of sexual harm orders. In some cases, there will be no time to go through the normal process for obtaining a full order. In those cases, it will be absolutely essential that action is taken to protect the child by means of an interim order. In either case, the sheriff must be satisfied that there is a prima facie case for making the order.

Annabel Goldie raised—