Hansard

I thank you for the opportunity to speak to amendment 32.Section 10 is a key section of the bill in which we will determine what length of separation is appropriate before divorce. The intention of the amendment is to preserve the current requirement that couples who are seeking a divorce to which both parties consent must not cohabit for a consecutive period of two years before divorce can be granted, rather than one year as the bill proposes. I understand that there are alternatives, such as that for which amendment 15 provides.Under the bill, the time for which couples must not cohabit before divorce will decrease from two years to one year. I have lodged amendment 32 in order to offer couples an appropriate cooling-off period in which to resolve their differences. As we have heard this morning, there are distinctions between reconciliation, mediation and the other options that exist. However, I hope that we can continue to focus on reconciliation.As the minister said, marriage should not be entered into lightly. In my opinion, it should not be regarded as being particularly disposable. Divorce should be the last possible option, rather than an option to which we should smooth the passage. I believe that the family unit is the fundamental unit of society. Divorce should be the last resort, especially when a marriage involves children.There is evidence to support the view that divorce has a profound impact on the lives of children. The national health service's national library for health reports that children of single parents are at increased risk of psychiatric disease, suicide, attempted suicide, injury and addiction.Furthermore, the Partnership for Children has commented that children of divorced parents are more likely themselves to have marital problems and to choose unstable partners, and that they tend to divorce earlier and more often. The evidence suggests that we end up in a vicious circle rather than a virtuous circle. If we are to have a stable society—in particular, stable family relationships that allow children to be nurtured—we need to be careful about what we do in legislating for family relationships. By providing for the retention of a second year, as in the present arrangements, in which to work out marriage difficulties, the intention of amendment 32 is to prevent such difficult circumstances as in the aforementioned consequences for the children of divorced parents. The previous arrangements drew a distinction only between situations in which there was consent between the two parties and situations in which there was no consent, but did not draw any distinction between circumstances in which there were children and circumstances in which there were no children. The Executive has gone to great pains to explain its position on the bill; it is to protect children. It might be difficult to see that in the bill, but I accept the assurance that its intention is to protect children. Perhaps we ought to have given some thought to making it more difficult—that is not the right word; I am not expressing this very well—or to whether there is a case for a longer period of separation when children are involved if we are genuine about trying to protect the interests of children. Divorce is undoubtedly more complex when children are involved. Opponents of amendment 32 might say that if both parties consent to divorce, then they should be allowed to divorce as soon as possible, and that one year is perfectly adequate. We have heard already this morning that a number of people change their minds right at the last minute. In such circumstances, a cooling-off period of substantial length would be appropriate, whether that is a year—I do not think that it should be a year—or 18 months or longer. I understand the proposals that have been made by others who think that we perhaps need to move on the matter, but not necessarily to have a period as long as a year. I am not convinced that that will give sufficient time for things to be worked out, especially when there are children.I know that there are proposals before us, other than the one in amendment 14, that will allow greater opportunities for reconciliation to be explored. It is difficult to produce an evidence base for precise periods of time that are suitable for granting divorce following a separation, and I respect the views of people whose views are different to mine. We have heard this morning about cases of abuse of spouses. In such circumstances, waiting for two years might have dangerous consequences for the individual who is being abused; at least, that case can be argued. However, that is quite a specific kind of case and in such circumstances the separation would normally be a fact anyway. The courts offer protection in such circumstances, and it is possible to get a divorce on the grounds of physical or other abuse.Under the Divorce (Scotland) Act 1976, divorce is available where marriage has broken down irretrievably and divorce can be granted to the pursuer providing that one of five factual circumstances exists. One of those circumstances—behaviour—addresses abuse; divorce can be granted under provisions on behaviour if the defendant has behaved in such a way that the pursuer cannot be expected to cohabit with him or her. Thus, amendment 32 would have no bearing on cases of spousal or family abuse, and individuals who suffer from those experiences would still be able to obtain a divorce and would not be disadvantaged in any way by the amendment.On amendment 15, I have expressed my view that I would prefer the period of two years to remain: that is the intention of amendment 32.On amendment 16, I note that no one has suggested the retention of the current five-year period. I certainly do not support it. I do not know how we can arrive at an appropriate evidence-based period because I suspect that such evidence simply does not exist. As Fergus Ewing suggested, many of the sources of evidence are quite rightly controlled by client confidentiality. I am more than happy to support Margaret Mitchell's suggestion that the limit should remain at three years where consent is not granted. Two years is a short period of time in that circumstance. My intention was to leave the limits at three years and two years as opposed to three years and 18 months, which Margaret Mitchell has proposed. Certainly, limits of two years and one year—in cases in which consent is not given and in those in which it is given, respectively—would be too short and could give the impression that we regard marriage as being rather disposable.I move amendment 32.