Meeting of the Parliament 10 March 2026 [Draft]
The assumption that the fact that somebody is going through the process after having made a request means that they would then inevitably and automatically seek to exercise that choice immediately is not borne out by the evidence from other jurisdictions around the world. People go through a process, and it might be many months and possibly even years later that they seek to follow through with a request. At that point, there would still be the requirement to establish that capacity and consent are valid.
People’s motivations are rarely singular, and symptoms that they find intolerable at the end of life might go beyond pain, such as vomiting and fungating wounds. Physical pain is not always the primary concern that is cited by dying people. In jurisdictions where assisted dying is legal, the top three end-of-life concerns that are recorded by the doctor on behalf of the patient are loss of autonomy, being less able to engage in activities that make life enjoyable and loss of dignity.
Taken together, amendments 136 and 1 risk narrowing eligibility in ways that do not reflect the complex and deeply personal nature of suffering at the end of life while potentially requiring individuals to undergo treatments that they would otherwise have refused. Throughout, my policy has been that it should be for assessing doctors, with input from other professionals where necessary, and supported by guidance under section 23, to determine those aspects of the terminal illness definition. As we heard during stage 1 evidence, doctors already regularly make such assessments, and clinical judgment should prevail over fixed definitions.
On that basis, I ask Daniel Johnson not to press his amendments but, if he does, I urge Parliament not to support them.