Meeting of the Parliament 10 March 2026 [Draft]
I start by echoing Pam Duncan-Glancy’s comments about the way in which colleagues across the board, irrespective of their position on the bill, have engaged with it over the past four and a half years. I also echo her thanks not just to the legislation team but to the non-Government bills unit, which has been performing heroics. I also thank my own team, which has been supporting me and—over recent days and throughout the process—other colleagues and their offices in relation to the bill.
I reciprocate Daniel Johnson’s generous comments by thanking him for the constructive engagement that we have had on the issue throughout the process. As he has ably demonstrated, he might be able to lay claim to being the only member of this Parliament who has read the legislation not only from the Australian Capital Territory and New Zealand but, I am fairly sure, from New South Wales, Western Australia and Oregon as well. He has lodged amendments at stage 2 and now at stage 3 that have enabled debate and allowed Parliament to take a view on some pretty key issues, and for that I am grateful.
I say all of that as a preamble to, I hope, softening the blow of confirming that I cannot support his amendments in this group. I remain of the view that the definition of terminal illness as set out in the bill is appropriate. Adding subjective terms such as “suffering intolerably”, as amendment 136 would do, is likely to add confusion. Jackie Baillie’s concerns are probably valid in that respect, too. That is perhaps illustrated by the attempt to define the term in amendment 1. The terms “advanced” and “progressive” are well understood by medical professionals, as the Health, Social Care and Sport Committee heard in evidence, and there are good reasons not to circumscribe those terms.
I understand Daniel Johnson’s intention, but I am concerned that his definition includes a requirement that treatments that are
“reasonably available and acceptable to the person”
must
“have lost … beneficial impact”.
I acknowledge that amendment 1 would place emphasis on what the person finds to be acceptable treatment. However, the requirement that those treatments have lost “beneficial impact” would mean that, if someone wished to refuse treatment such as chemotherapy because they no longer found it acceptable due to the side effects, the fact that the chemotherapy might still have a “beneficial impact” could mean that they might not be deemed eligible for an assisted death. We might be requiring an individual to undergo invasive and risky medical procedures that they had made a conscious decision not to undergo—I know that Daniel Johnson would not wish that to happen.
On the inclusion of the term “suffering intolerably”, I am concerned that the definition is somewhat subjective and appears to be limited to physical pain.