Meeting of the Parliament 15 March 2016
Of course it is. Safety is of paramount importance—it is the number 1 priority before, during and after all such works and in all other interventions. That applies even in difficult budgetary periods. It was made perfectly clear to FETA that any financial decision should be taken with a view to always protecting the structural integrity of the bridge.
The Scottish Government had taken a wider decision that was aimed at strengthening the strategic links over the Firth of Forth. That was, of course, the construction of a completely new crossing—the Queensferry crossing.
The unpredictable event on the Forth road bridge occurred in early December, necessitating closure of the bridge. Some may conclude from the closure that a wholly different approach to risk management is required—one that somehow expects the unexpected and the unpredictable. That is not my conclusion. We must continue to apply a robust methodology in order to identify the greatest risks, to remove or mitigate those risks—subject to adapting to circumstances and emerging evidence—and to balance funding requirements, making the case for increased investment where the evidence supports that case. The decision to build in structural health monitoring as part of the new Queensferry crossing—a first for a United Kingdom bridge—is an example of the efforts that will safeguard that essential crossing for the future.
The committee has highlighted the crucial issue of Scottish ministers’ grant funding of the bridge, including contrasting that with income from tolls. Prior to their abolition on the Forth road bridge, tolls generated income of around £10 million per annum. Since 2007, Scottish ministers have invested £107.8 million in the Forth road bridge, or £11 million or £12 million per annum.
FETA invested additional sums from its own reserves—reserves that reached as high as £7 million in 2011-12. In part, that was due to the Scottish Government providing maximum flexibility to FETA prior to and after an extremely tight spending round. Although it is true that following the abolition of tolls the funding mechanism for FETA inevitably changed, what did not change was the fact that Scottish ministers continued to fund fully all essential and safety-critical schemes, as well as other works at the Forth road bridge. FETA prepared an indicative capital programme of its future works needs in isolation from the spending review process and from consideration of the impacts of United Kingdom budget cuts and what budgets might be available. However, as FETA representatives explained to the committee, because of the good professional relationships that existed, budgets were agreed, the capital programme was re-phased and re-shaped, critical and non-critical works were progressed and, when exceptional demands arose, they were funded, too. I made it clear in evidence that any further work requests would have been considered by Transport Scotland.
With regard to the works that were carried through, the final iterative report on the truss end links study to FETA by its engineering advisers noted that the truss end links were, crucially, not overstressed. The tower brackets and the welds, not the truss end links, were the focus of the report. FETA, not ministers, chose not to progress a design-development consultancy contract costing between £150,000 and £500,000, which was well within FETA’s budget. No evidence exists to suggest that the decision was incorrect. As I explained earlier, the defect was unforeseen and, subsequently, FETA proceeded to develop a scheme that was proportionate to the problem that it aimed to solve, and work progressed in May 2015.
We have undertaken a complete additional inspection of the bridge and have found no significant issues. We have installed more monitoring equipment, which is providing good quality information to us on the performance of the bridge, and further additional visual inspections of the bridge are being carried out to provide extra insurance.
The defect was not foreseen, nor was it foreseeable. FETA was an independent organisation that maintained and managed the bridge and was independent of the Scottish Government. There is no evidence to suggest that FETA ought to have acted differently. Despite a tough spending review, if emergencies arose, Transport Scotland could have intervened to support FETA, if asked to do so. Scottish ministers’ decision to close the bridge was the correct one. I believe that there was an excellent response to the closure and that we have taken all reasonable precautions to prevent another closure.
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