Hansard

I thank the member in charge of the bill for that intervention. I am sure that Mr Harvie will realise that I am restricted in what I can say because I am speaking on behalf of the committee. He has put his point on the record. It is reasonable to say, I think, that the point that the committee is making is that making an independent choice does not necessarily have no consequences for other people in society, be they frail, elderly or terminally ill people. I believe that that is what the committee concluded in relation to that area, but I thank the member for putting his views on the record.

The committee concluded that, if assisted suicide were to be permitted, robust safeguards would be required to protect the rights of others, including some of the very vulnerable people whom I have just mentioned. Safeguards to address public safety considerations would also be necessary. The committee was not persuaded that the principle of respect for autonomy on its own requires assisted suicide to be legalised.

I turn to the concerns about a lack of definitions in the bill. Our committee noted the concerns about the fact that, for example, no definition is given of “euthanasia” or “assisted suicide”. We found that surprising. In addition, the bill does not specify a means of suicide; it seems to be widely assumed, including by representatives of pharmacists’ professional bodies, that the bill envisages the ingestion of a lethal dose of drugs. However, the bill refers to

“any drug or other substance or means”.

That further complicates attempts to establish what the line between assisted suicide and euthanasia might look like in practice. The committee appreciates that, for some people, that gives rise to concern that, because the bill does not define either term, it does not specify precisely which actions it intends to shield from liability. It can be argued that that is further obscured by the lack of clarity in the bill regarding the means of suicide.

The terms “terminal” and “life-shortening” appear in the bill. Those terms are absolutely central in delineating the range of persons who would be eligible to receive assistance in ending their lives if the bill were to pass into law, yet neither of them is defined, and “terminal” entails nothing specific in terms of remaining life expectancy.

In its submission, Doctors for Assisted Suicide said:

“We ... welcome the fact that no time limits are laid down by the Bill. Doctors are often inaccurate in predicting how long someone has to live.”

However, David Stephenson QC of the Faculty of Advocates observed:

“It therefore seems to follow”

from the lack of definition

“that any illness that shortens a person’s expectancy of life is life shortening. The Faculty of Advocates’ submission pointed out that many everyday conditions are likely to be life shortening. For example, type 2 diabetes can shorten life”.—[Official Report, Health and Sport Committee, 13 January 2015; c 26.]

The committee considers that the bill’s failure to define those key terms leaves far too many people potentially eligible to receive assistance.

The bill does not provide for a general clarification of the law on assisted suicide. Assisted suicide that took place outside the scope of the bill would still be dealt with under the common law. The common law, and any uncertainty therein, would remain the fallback position. It is in that context that we must view section 24, which provides protection from liability for those who make incorrect statements or who do anything else that is inconsistent with the legislation as long as they are

“acting in good faith and in intended pursuance of this act”

and have not been “careless”. That is what is commonly called a savings clause. The rationale behind section 24 is the sense that it would be undesirable if people who made minor or technical errors in complying with the procedure that is set out in the bill were at risk of being charged for a common-law crime. The term “careless” is not defined, nor is the phrase

“acting in good faith and in intended pursuance of this Act”.

In this regard, the committee concluded:

“It seems clear that in numerous respects, some of which go to the heart of the Bill’s purpose, the language of the Bill would introduce much uncertainty. In the context of a statute that makes an exception to the law of homicide and permits one person to assist in the death of another, such significant uncertainty must be unacceptable and would require to be addressed should Parliament approve the Bill at Stage 1.”

A number of witnesses raised concerns about the potential for coercion of vulnerable people if the bill were to become law. The committee suggests that, should the Parliament approve the bill today, the member in charge may wish to consider some of the suggestions from witnesses regarding measures aimed at minimising the risk of coercion. However, the committee notes the observation by the British Medical Association that that will in no way guarantee the absence of coercion in the context of assisted suicide.

I will not have time in my speech this afternoon to discuss issues that the committee raised in relation to the conscience clause, although perhaps other members will do so; in relation to the role of the licensed facilitator, which is a very important matter that I am sure other members will talk about; or in relation to various other areas.

In the short time that I have remaining, let me reiterate the final conclusions of the Health and Sport Committee. We recognise

“the strength of feeling expressed by those who have given evidence both in support of and in opposition to the general principles of the Bill ... The Committee believes the bill contains significant flaws. These present major challenges as to whether the Bill can be progressed. Whilst the majority of the Committee does not support the general principles of the Bill, given that the issue of assisted suicide is a matter of conscience, the Committee has chosen to make no formal recommendation to the Parliament on the Bill.”