Equalities, Human Rights and Civil Justice Committee 29 April 2025
I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to the debate as we consider the motion before us this morning.
The motion has been lodged under the standing orders of the Parliament, and it is important that we have a full and open debate. I recognise that debating and deciding on such a motion is challenging, as it relates to a colleague and their responsibilities in the committee, so I wish to address my comments to all colleagues in a respectful tone. We should deal in factual information and provide an opportunity for the deputy convener to clarify her position to the committee and more widely. I have not provided commentary on the motion prior to the debate in the committee, because I believe that the proper place to have the debate and to reach a conclusion is in the Parliament.
The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom has handed down a judgment in the case of For Women Scotland Ltd v the Scottish Ministers, stating that the meaning of the terms “sex”, “man” and “woman” in the Equality Act 2010 refers to biological sex. That judgment was unanimous.
Since that judgment, there have understandably been a number of different reactions from different organisations, politicians, academics, lawyers and individuals in society. Many have welcomed the clarity of the judgment and the definitions that are in it, particularly for women and sex-based rights. Many have expressed concerns about what the judgment will mean in practice for transgender people and their lives.
Throughout debates on the broader issues, the discourse has often been heated, and I have consistently said in all my contributions on those issues that applying general pejorative terms to whole groups of people is wrong and does a disservice to our debates. I note, once again, that when giving the opinion of the court, Lord Hodge stated that the court
“counsel against reading this judgment as a triumph of one or more groups in our society at the expense of another. It is not.”
Since the judgment, people have exercised their freedom of speech to voice opinions on the judgment. That is, of course, entirely right in our democracy. MSPs around the committee table and across the Parliament have done likewise. However, in doing so, it is incumbent on us all to recognise and respect the jurisdiction of the court, the independence of the judiciary and the fundamental importance of upholding the rule of law. Indeed, we have a solemn duty as parliamentarians to do so.
As we have already heard, in the comments that she made in Aberdeen, the deputy convener referred to
“the bigotry, prejudice and hatred that we see coming from the Supreme Court and from so many other institutions in our society.”
Although I acknowledge the passionate reactions to the judgment, as I have previously outlined, I was concerned to read such a statement from the deputy convener, which appears to suggest that the institution of the Supreme Court and therefore its judges are engaged in bigotry, prejudice or hatred in relation to their judgments.
I was further concerned by the correspondence that the committee received from the Faculty of Advocates and the response of the Law Society of Scotland. The faculty sought to remind members that
“the Supreme Court—indeed, all judges—are in post to apply the law. They do not take sides. They decide without fear or favour, consistently with the judicial oath.”
The Law Society said:
“The Supreme Court’s task is to consider the most difficult and complex legal questions and it must be able to do so without fear or favour.”
I agree with those statements.
In the past, I was equally concerned when the Supreme Court was accused by members of Parliament of showing partiality in determining judgments on, for example, the consent of the United Kingdom Parliament in relation to triggering article 50 or in relation to the legality of the prorogation of the UK Parliament.
The Equalities, Human Rights and Civil Justice Committee has an important role in this Parliament, not only on matters of equalities and human rights but on civil justice. It is the civil justice role that I am most interested in talking about today. It is our job to scrutinise the administration and delivery of civil justice in the Scottish courts and in relation to the Supreme Court as the final court of appeal.
Our scrutiny role is important but so, too, is our role in legislation, given that we recently considered a bill at stages 1 and 2 to amend the regulation of legal services in Scotland, which included taking evidence from the most senior members of the judiciary.
For us to be effective and our role properly carried out, all members must leave no doubt that we support the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. To that end, it would be immensely helpful to me if the deputy convener would take this opportunity, on record in the committee, to withdraw her remarks relating to the Supreme Court; to state her respect, without qualification, for the rule of law and the independence of the judiciary; and to acknowledge the concerns that have been raised with this committee by the Faculty of Advocates and the Law Society with regard to her remarks.
I appreciate that the deputy convener has already made a statement. However, I do not feel that it has done what I have just set out, so I am willing to give way to her, if appropriate, convener, if she wishes to clarify anything at this point.