Meeting of the Parliament 25 February 2016
I am sorry—I will not take an intervention.
At present, a jury in Scotland can return a verdict of guilty when at least eight of its members are in favour of that verdict. That level of support is required whether the jury has a full complement of 15 jurors or is reduced in numbers. When a guilty verdict does not attract the support of at least eight jurors, the accused is acquitted. Under those rules, a person may be convicted on the basis of a simple majority, and there is no potential for a hung jury: the only possible outcomes are a finding of guilty or an acquittal.
Scotland is the only common-law jurisdiction where an accused person can be convicted on a simple majority verdict. Other systems that are based on a simple majority verdict have additional protections. In Italy, for example, a conviction is allowed on a simple majority, but two judges sit alongside six lay jurors. In Belgium, jurors can convict on a simple majority, but a unanimous panel of judges can overturn an erroneous verdict.
My bill would retain the jury size of 15, but move to a qualified majority, with at least two thirds of the jury being required to convict. The number required to convict would be reduced on a sliding basis if excusals or other absences reduced the size of the jury.
The Scottish Government has also consulted on the subject, and I remain puzzled as to why it has arrived at a different place today. In 2012, the Government looked at a number of legal reforms, and in 2013, it introduced the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill. The Government’s consideration of increasing the jury majority was linked to the removal of corroboration and mine was linked to the removal of the not proven verdict, but our consultations arrived at the same conclusion. The Criminal Justice (Scotland) Bill, as passed, saw the provision on jury majorities removed in light of recommendations made in the Bonomy review. Unlike the Scottish Government, I believe that the Parliament should not have to wait for the outcome of further research before it reaches a decision on the abolition of the not proven verdict.
As Professor Chalmers and Professor Leverick said in their submission to the Justice Committee, it is a matter of principle, and a decision should not be
“evaded by calls for further empirical research.”
I hope that, come decision time, members will agree with me that there is no longer a place in the Scottish legal system for three verdicts. It is time to get rid of the one verdict that has the potential to confuse a jury, stigmatise the acquitted and upset victims. If the not proven verdict is disposed of, a safeguard is to increase the size of the jury majority that is needed to convict, and to move both measures forward at the same time.
I am pleased to have moved the motion.